Christ and the Holy Spirit in the Eucharist 1 highlights a continuing problem in the ecumenical dialogue between East and West, viz., the question of a proper mission of the Holy Spirit. Though my position on this subject is, I hope, already clear in my existing publications, 2 I am prompted by Kilmartin to attempt a more explicit statement, one that takes more into account the dissenting voices to be heard in the West. As Kilmartin has pointed out, the Eastern Orthodox position is that there is a proper mission of the Holy Spirit, that it began at Pentecost, and that in a real sense it replaced the mission of Christ, which ended at that point. It seems that in the Orthodox mind there is a difficulty in accepting the compatibility of the two missions as existing side by side or even in a co-ordinated manner. Perhaps a continuing mission of Christ would be seen as a threat to the reality of a proper mission of the Holy Spirit, to which the Orthodox are strongly attached in both theology and faith. It should not be too difficult to show that a continuing mission of Christ poses no such threat, and indeed that to admit one would be to do greater justice to Scripture and tradition. But in this paper I shall be more concerned with the reluctance of the West to admit a special mission of the Holy Spirit at all, which is a far more serious matter. Again, as Kilmartin notes, the efforts of some Western theologians, and particularly of Heribert Mühlen, to present a case for a proper mission have not proved conspicuously successful with their Western colleagues. And yet, it seems that as long as Western theology fails to attain this position, a firm basis for the development of fruitful dialogue with the East will be lacking.
case which fails in the light of deeper considerations. But the existence of at least this case is recognized by the West by its willingness to allow a mission of the Holy Spirit by "appropriation."
What, then, are these considerations? There are two. The first is that in this matter the sources, while speaking mainly of the Holy Spirit, speak also of the Father and the Son. Hence, for example, the doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity by grace. And the second is that a normative theological axiom, omnia opera Trinitatis sunt indivisa, i.e., that the works of God in the world (ad extra) are done by all three divine persons, seems to stand inexorably in the way of a proper mission. I shall look at these in turn.
A RESPONSE TO WESTERN MISGIVINGS
While appropriation allows for all three divine persons, it is still not an acceptable solution, as it fails to preserve the emphasis which the sources place on the Holy Spirit in the life of Christ, at Pentecost, and thereafter in the life of the individual believer and the Church. Appropriation puts all three persons on the same real level, singling out a particular one of them only in the order of predication. This is clearly a reduction of the content of the deposit of faith. To be acceptable, a solution must allow the Holy Spirit to be seen as sent by a title proper to Himself, and this can only mean that He has a proper mission. The other two persons are then seen as present and active by virtue of other titles. Thus, if the Holy Spirit is present in His own right, there too is Christ, for Christ is the content of the Gift of the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Christ; and where Christ is, there too is the Father, for Christ is the sacrament of the Father, the Word of the Father. This copresence of the persons in the working of the economic Trinity reflects their circumincession in the immanent Trinity. A crucial point, of course, will be the determination of the title proper to the Holy Spirit, and this I shall address later in the paper. If it can be answered, and answered correctly, the emergent solution must be preferred to appropriation, as it will do greater justice to the sources of revelation.
We turn now to the theological axiom. (When I speak below of grace, it should be borne in mind that grace stands to the mission of the Holy Spirit as the Incarnation does to the mission of the Son.) At least at first sight, the Incarnation, as that of the Son alone, seems even more defenseless against the axiom than does grace as Gift of the Holy Spirit alone, for no claim is made to associate the other two divine persons with the Incarnation as is done, and rightly, in the case of grace. No one can deny that the Incarnation is a work of God in the world. However, whether theology could account for it at the theoretical level or not, at the practical level of faith it was always perfectly clear that the Incar-nation was of the Son alone. Now if the axiom is correct, as it undoubtedly is, it can admit of no exception. What, then, is to be made of Kilmartin's report of Battista Monden that "all activity (of God) ad extra is common to all three Persons of the Trinity apart from the Incarnation," 3 or his own assertion that "the axiom does not relate to the theology of the Incarnation"? 4 (It should be noted, however, that he qualifies this somewhat by saying that "the Incarnation is the work of the Son alone, though also a work of the Godhead and so in some sense done by all three divine Persons." 5 ) We must affirm on the one hand that the Son alone became man, and on the other that as an operation of God in the world the Incarnation is the work of all three persons. As St. Augustine put it, "Only the Son, who is the Word of God, became flesh, though it was the Trinity that brought this about."
6 Both logically and actually, the way out of the difficulty is to say that the Incarnation will include all that pertains to a work of God in the world, but in itself is something more. Therefore, in so far as it includes a work of God in the world, it is the work of all three persons; but in so far as it is something more, it is a work of the Son alone. We must now try to express with some exactness this total reality and that which it contains. We shall then be in a position to make a similar statement about grace as proper to the Holy Spirit and at the same time involving the Father and the Son.
We begin by presenting another authoritative theological axiom, In Deo omnia sunt unum ubi non obviât relationis oppositio, which we can translate as "In the Godhead all things are one except where the opposition of relationship rules this out." This means, at least in part, that the ultimate ground of distinction between the persons is the relationships between them, which make it impossible for them to be totally identical with each other. Though they are identical in nature, indeed identical with the divine nature, they are nevertheless distinct as persons, because their relationships, and these alone, prevent them from coalescing and collapsing into a single person. So, for example, the relationship of fatherhood/sonship which exists between the first two persons keeps them, as it were, at bay from each other and stops them from becoming one person, because it is impossible that a father be the son whom he generates and that a son be the father by whom he is generated. Without laboring the point further, we can draw the conclusion that the only ground for distinguishing the divine persons is strictly innertrinitarian. This sheds light on our first axiom. The works of God in the world have to be common to the three persons, because from any standpoint outside the Trinity, i.e., a standpoint which is not identical with one of the persons, there is no longer given any ground for distinguishing them. Hence a creature, purely as such, can only relate to God as one, and must have been created by Him as one. With our knowledge of the Trinity we can re-express this, if we like, in a Trinitarian way and say that the creature relates to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but the relationship will be identical in each case, so that in fact there will be only one relationship. The only way, therefore, in which a creature can have a special relationship with one divine person, which relationship will set up different relationships with the other two, will be through the assimilation of the creature into the Trinity, which can only mean that it is brought into a true union of being with one of the persons. That is to say, in the first instance, the creature must have the being of God communicated to it. It must receive, to use Karl Rahner's famous expression, the "self-communication of God," and to be capable of that it must be created spirit, i.e., man.
When man and woman are drawn into the Trinity, they will receive the self-communication of God in a certain way. What is this way? The traditional answer to this question simply reverses the order of the persons in the Trinity, and says that man and woman first receive the Holy Spirit, are thus drawn into union with the Son, and through the Son commune with the Father. At least, this is the answer given for ordinary people. A quite different answer is given for Christ, as his human nature is said to be united directly with the Son, and then through the Son to the Father on one side and to the Holy Spirit on the other. More of this later. The answer for ordinary people is taken from the New Testament (see, e.g., Eph 2:18) and then explained as follows. God reaches out to us in the order Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in that the Father sends the Son, who in turn sends the Holy Spirit. Therefore, our return to God will follow the path that reverses this order. It inverts the order of the missions of the divine persons, which order itself reflects the processions of the immanent Trinity. Thus, if we can call this particular conceptualization of the Trinity the procession model, our return reflects an inversion of the procession model. This is taken as self-evident. However, in my book on grace I claim that it is far from self-evident, and indeed is methodologically incorrect. 7 A wrong reason is provided for the right answer. And because the reason is wrong, there is no proper explanation for how the Holy Spirit unites man and woman to the Son. To say that this is because the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son is no true answer. This states a fact, but the fact does not explain what it is supposed to explain.
The basic problem with the traditional answer is not that it lines up events in the order of salvation with the inner life of the Trinity. That is not only desirable but necessary. But theology is now very much aware that whatever we know about the latter is an extrapolation from the former. Historically, the Church's doctrine of the immanent Trinity grew out of the biblical doctrine of the Trinity (which depended on a biblical doctrine of Christ), and the doctrine of the economic Trinity resulted from feeding back the former into the latter. What was not appreciated, as Edward Schillebeeckx has pointed out, 8 was that the official doctrine of the Trinity developed from the doctrine of Christ peculiar to the Fourth Gospel. To Schillebeeckx' observation I should like to add that John, alone among the Gospels, presented a descending Christology. That is to say, just as the divine Son, Son of Man and Word of God, was sent down from heaven by the Father and in turn sent the Holy Spirit, the "other Paraclete," from the Father, so in the Godhead itself the Father generates the Son, and the two together breathe forth the Holy Spirit (according to the Western form of the doctrine). Then reversing the epistemological order (i.e., the order of discovery) to acquire the ontological order (i.e., the order of givenness), theology came to understand the Incarnation of the Son and the Gift of the Holy Spirit, the missions of the second and third persons respectively (the latter mission, of course, being seen as appropriated only), as prolongations into the world of the processions within the Trinity itself. But it was not realized that in this Trinitarian model theology possessed not something absolute, not the only way of conceptualizing the Trinity, but only something relative, only a way of doing this, a way which, having grown out of descending Christology, harmonized with it alone. If one were to extrapolate from an ascending Christology, one would acquire a quite different model of the Trinity, as we shall see. The problem with the traditional answer, then, is that it absolutized what was in fact only a relative model of the Trinity, and applied this indiscriminately, to questions where it had no place, i.e., to questions of ascending theology (if I may thus broaden the application of the term "ascending," and with it "descending"). While the ultimate reason will emerge only with the next point, a proximate reason for the compatibility of the bestowal model with ascending theology, as against the incompatibility of the procession model with it, can be given immediately. It is that the bestowal model is essentially concerned with the return to God (the Father), while the procession model is essentially concerned with outward movement from Him. For while in the bestowal model the Son is seen as other than the Father, and hence at least initially as moving out from Him, the model is completed only with the Son's return to the Father in love. The Holy Spirit, as the Father's love for the Son, moves out from the Father to the Son, but as the Son's love for the Father returns to the Father, its ultimate source. He is the "bond" uniting the Son to the Father in love. But the procession model is concerned only with the outward movement from the Father. The Son moves out from Him, and the Holy Spirit, as proceeding from both, moves out further still. Simply to invert the model, in order to explain man's/woman's return to God, is to do violence to its nature.
We come now to the second point. From the standpoint of methodology, the ground of the procession model, and hence also of the psychological model of Augustine, must be said to be the two great ordered events of salvation history: the mission of Christ by the Father, and the mission of the Holy Spirit by Christ from the Father. From these data alone it is not only legitimate, but necessary, to infer that in the Godhead itself the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, though the exact relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Son remains thus far undetermined, and was in fact interpreted differently in the East and the West. (Notice that methodologically the doctrine of the immanent Trinity long accepted in the West depends on a proper mission of the Holy Spirit.) What Augustine did was to clarify the question by introducing the further reflection that, given the pure spirituality of God, the two processions in the Godhead will reflect, at least in the order of our knowledge, the two spiritual operations of man/woman: knowledge and love. Hence the psychological model, in which the Son proceeds by knowledge and the Holy Spirit by love. Note that this now exhibits the distinguishing mark of Augustinian, and thence of all Western, Trinitarian thought, leading inevitably to the Filioque and attaining its climax in St. Anselm: the starting point is the unity of the divine nature and not the distinction of persons. For the two above-mentioned spiritual operations belong to a single subject. Indeed, it has been a standing objection to the bestowal model that, in asserting the Holy Spirit to be the mutual love of the Father and the Son, it dispenses with this necessary unity, for, while retaining and deploying the operations of a single subject, it insists on duality of subject.
Whatever about the early history of the bestowal model, according to the canons of methodology its true ground is something completely different from that of the procession model. In the epistemological order the ground of the procession model is the missions of Christ and the Holy Spirit, and specifically the latter, as this constituted the religious experience of the first Christians, who were responsible for the New Testament. Hence the ground of this model in the ontobgical order is Jesus' experience of being sent by the Father. And the comparable ground of the bestowal model is likewise the experience of Jesus, not, however, that of being sent by the Father but that of being united to Him. The experience of being sent is a corollary of this. The bestowal model is thus more basic than the procession model, for it arises from the phenomenon from which the Christian religion itself takes its origin, and not, as with the procession model, from something consequent upon this. The phenomenon is Jesus' experience of being uniquely close to God, which he expressed in the prayer formula "my Father," and which he knew placed on him a responsibility for others, which came to expression chiefly in his preaching of the kingdom of God, to be entered by faith. The experience of Jesus was one of being uniquely loved by God, and this love evoked from him a love of the Father which was a love faithful unto death, and the sole and consuming motivating force of his life, and which he himself knew was radically different from that of other people (see, for example, the expression "my Father and your Father"). This mutual love of the Father and Jesus, the unique bond that existed between them, was the Holy Spirit Himself. It would take too long, and in any case it would be superfluous, to retrace here the steps by which this point is established. The foundations for it were laid in my book on grace, and the task was completed in my recent article already referred to. It will suffice simply to repeat a conclusion from this: "If Jesus is brought into being as the divine Son in humanity through the Father's radical bestowal of love on him, which love is the Holy Spirit, and if the response of Jesus is a love for the Father which ultimately is a return of the same Spirit, then in the immanent Trinity itself the Holy Spirit exists as the mutual love of the Father and the Son."
11 Here, then, is the true ground and justification of the bestowal model of the Trinity, and, as is readily seen, it essentially reflects not the outward movement from God which we know as the missions, but the inward movement by which man and woman are united to God in the two great basic events to which the missions correspond: the Incarnation and grace. This is the ultimate reason for its being the only correct Trinitarian model for an ascending Christology and theology generally.
From this can be seen the answer to the above-mentioned objection to the bestowal model, for in fact this model has nothing to do with the psychological model, and hence objections raised against it from that quarter do not touch it. In the bestowal model love is conceived not as the second operation (after knowledge) of a single spiritual subject, but rather as the bond of persons. We are now in a position to answer a question put earlier in the paper: How are we to understand the Incarnation as proper to the Son and at the same time including a work of God in the world common to all three divine persons? In so far as it is a work of God in the world, the Incarnation must be a work of divine power and an instance of creation. Therefore, it is the creation of the humanity of Christ that is the work of all three persons. There is nothing new about this; it is the traditional answer. But as a work proper to the Son, the Incarnation must be by the same act assimilation (or assumption) of the sacred humanity into the Trinity so that it is united to the Son alone. The one act, which is essentially inward-drawing, has inbuilt into it a prior outward-moving aspect. It is the same with any interpersonal act. For instance, when I address a friendly word to some other person, the first thing that happens is that my word passes from me to him, but the end result is that the other is drawn into the ambit of my own person, and so communication takes place. Augustine saw this clearly in regard to the Incarnation and expressed it in the succinct phrase ipsa assumptions creatur™ literally, "it is created by the assumption itself." (This Augustinian insight provided the leitmotif of Felix Malmberg's book Ein Leib-Ein Geist, 14 to which I shall return later.) Thus we can say that the humanity of Christ is created (by all three divine persons) by the same act by which it is assumed (by the Son alone). Now this assimilation, which we have also called an assumption and a communication, is to be understood according to the bestowal model of the Trinity, since it is an event of ascending theology. According to this model, assimilation will mean situating the humanity of Christ at one of the two poles of the Trinity: the person of the Father or the person of the Son. What was essential divine power outside the Trinity becomes personal divine love within it. The humanity of Christ is engaged by the outward-moving love of the Father for the Son, which love is the Holy Spirit, and by the action of the Spirit is drawn into unity with the sole proper object of this love, viz., the divine Son. Given that the Incarnation is the most radical possible self-communication of God to a creature, the two aspects of this love distinguished above, its creativity and its "assimilativity," will attain the limit of their possible radicality. Hence the creation will be creation in the strict sense, i.e., ex nihilo, and not just re-creation as happens in grace, and instead of mere union with the Son unity of being with Him will result, so that Christ is the divine Son in humanity. From what has been said it is clear, against St. Thomas, 15 that only the Son, and not the Father (or the Holy Spirit), can become man. And the basic love which Christ returns to the Father will be the Holy Spirit, now seen as the love of the Son for the Father, but as it were "incarnate" in human love.
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I now make, as promised, a similar statement about grace, and hence about the proper mission of the Holy Spirit. I begin with Christ's love of the Father, which is the Holy Spirit. But love of God and love of neighbor are the self-same love.
17 Therefore Christ's love for men and women will be the same Holy Spirit by which he loves the Father. This is how the sending of the Holy Spirit by Christ at Pentecost is to be understood. His love, the Holy Spirit, is conveyed to us sacramentally, i.e., by his word, as is the case with all human love. The gospel, therefore, is Christ's word of love addressed to us, by which, if we accept it, we become already in an incipient way his brothers and sisters. But this acceptance draws us into the ambit of the Father's paternal love, which is also the Holy Spirit, but now the Spirit of sonship. Linked with Christ through faith in his word, we are reborn in the power of the same Spirit who made him unique Son of God in humanity, and so we become sons and daughters of the Father (in the Son). Christ's offer of the Holy Spirit is for us the In this very brief account we have traced the steps from the Holy Spirit's entry in His individual person into the plan of salvation to His mission at Pentecost (or at the death of Christ, if one wants to take a critical stance towards the Lucan theology). This, I claim, gives a satisfactory account of the data of revelation, and at the same time is immune to the objections which are brought against a proper mission. We conclude, therefore, that in this matter there is no real problem in letting the sources of revelation speak for themselves. The mission of the Holy Spirit is proper to Himself and not merely a mission by appropriation.
SOME RELATED MATTERS

Malmberg's Opinion and Mühlen's Critique
It is instructive to note that Mühlen responded, negatively, to a theology which must be regarded as an anticipation of that which I am proposing. I refer to the work of Malmberg, which I came across only after my own had been published. Written originally in Dutch in 1958, it still merits attention, though, as we shall see, it is marred by some notable shortcomings. It is particularly interesting to see Mühlen's reasons for rejecting this theology, which he describes as "a speculatively ill-conceived appendage to the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation." In Mühlen's theology the distinction between the Incarnation and the anointing of Jesus is important, but, working always from the procession model of the Trinity even when dealing with a theme such as the anointing which is a theme of ascending Christology, he does not appreciate that the anointing is not something secondary, something dependent on the Incarnation, but another way of conceiving the Incarnation itself. Indeed, the very word "incarnation" (literally, "becoming flesh," "becoming man") is a term of descending Christology (which is not surprising, seeing that it comes from the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel). In the theology which I am advocating, and which follows a particular vein of patristic theology, the Incarnation and the anointing are two ways of presenting the same event, the one in the perspective of descending, the other in the perspective of ascending, Christology. Malmberg's instincts were right, therefore, when in discussing this particular text, the Christology of which is ascending, he did not distinguish between the Incarnation and the anointing.
With regard to the second objection, it is interesting to note how firmly Mühlen's mind is set in the approach of descending Christology, for he does not say that the role of the Holy Spirit is not to unite a nature with a person, which would be a more logical way of stating his objection, but rather that it is not the role of the Holy Spirit to unite a person with a nature. However, granted that in the Trinity the role of the Holy Spirit is to unite the persons of the Father and the Son, a role which appears in all clarity in the bestowal model, I have no difficulty in accepting Mühlen's stipulation that the role of the Holy Spirit is to unite persons The second comment arises from the fact that, because of the axiom of the works of God in the world, Monden, in rejecting Mühlen's thesis of a proper mission of the Holy Spirit, rejects his further statement that, just as there is a personal epiphany of the Son in the Incarnation, there is a personal epiphany of the Holy Spirit in the Church. My comment on this is that, for the reasons given in the body of this paper, Monden is wrong in rejecting the proper mission, but that he is right in rejecting a personal epiphany of the Holy Spirit. In general, one should be wary of the tendency to compare the two missions as similar. It is more likely that in their distinction from each other they are to be contrasted rather than compared. The epiphany is a case in point. The liturgy attributes an epiphany only to Christ, and rightly. The reason is that to have an epiphany in any acceptable sense of the word, there must be an incarnation in the strict sense. To make an epiphany, a divine person must "appear" in His person, and this will be possible only if He is incarnate "The Active Role" 237. in the strict sense. As only the Son can be incarnate, only the Son can make an epiphany. But this does not prevent the Holy Spirit from having a proper mission. Perhaps Mühlen has confused epiphany with revelation. The Holy Spirit can be revealed, indeed was revealed, at Pentecost, but this does not imply that He has made an epiphany.
A further point, here overlooked by Mühlen, is that the Holy Spirit, not being incarnate Himself, has the role of pointing to the divine person who is incarnate, so that, while He does not make an epiphany Himself, He assists and promotes the epiphany of the divine Son. This is strongly attested by the New Testament, where the content of the experience of the Holy Spirit is not the Spirit Himself but Christ and his teaching.
Finally, Mühlen is at least being consistent here, for elsewhere he maintains that because of His union with the Church the Holy Spirit acquires a personal history. 27 However, as with an epiphany, the only way in which a divine person can have a personal history is by being incarnate. One can say, therefore, that the divine Son had a history, because He was incarnate in Jesus and Jesus had a history. But no such statement can be made of the Holy Spirit. It is only the Church in its specifically human dimension that can have a history. This is not to deny that in some mysterious way the Holy Spirit is affected by the history of the Church because of His union with it. If a wife can be affected by what happens to her husband even though she does not undergo the same things herself, and if against the claims of Greek philosophy we can say that God is affected ("offended") by our sins, we should also be able to say that the Holy Spirit is affected by the history of the Church. But that is not to say that He Himself has a history.
Quasi-formal Causality
We have reached this point in the paper without once mentioning quasi-formal causality. The omission has been deliberate, the purpose being to show that the case for a proper mission of the Holy Spirit by no means depends on it. Historically, it was the development of the idea of a divine formal causality (by which God communicates Himself to creatures), as distinct from divine efficient causality (by which He posits in existence something other than Himself), that led Rahner to his great synthesizing idea of the self-communication of God, and later in expounding this idea he had recourse to this scholastic category. But it was like a ladder which, having given access to a new high point, could be kicked away, for the theology of the self-communication of God does not require it. No one needs to be told that the day of scholastic theology is over, and so a discussion today centering on quasi-formal causality would be Cf. Una mystica persona 177. regarded in most circles as irrelevant. However, though the scholastic categories were demonstrably less adequate to their subject matter than those in use today, they possessed certain qualities of their own, notable among which was clarity. In its day quasi-formal causality, including efficient causality as its "deficient mode," was a precise tool for shaping the same ideas which this paper has been trying to convey. Thus, quasiformal causality was essentially assimilative, while the included efficient causality was essentially outgoing. In my own further development of the category, it was seen as exercised by the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively in the Incarnation and grace, and was the communication of these two persons, and the two modalities of the ^//-communication of the Father, in the plan of salvation.
28 Hence, if the idea is attacked today, one should look to see exactly what is being attacked, and whether it is something that one would still want to preserve in the theology that has superseded scholasticism.
An unyielding critic of quasi-formal causality in regard to the beatific vision and grace, though not to the Incarnation, is William Hill.
29 His position merits longer treatment than can be given it here, where we must concentrate on his main point. He maintains that by quasi-formal causality Rahner does not mean information at all, but only actuation, where to actuate is "to render existent, either simply ... or in some determinate way."
30 (This provides the sense in which he accepts it for the Incarnation.) If Hill is right, "quasi-formal causality" is a misnomer, the "quasi" notwithstanding. But Rahner does mean information, though he is careful to exclude the idea that God enters into natural composition with the creature. Otherwise he could hardly say that God "determines" the creature, 31 taken to imply change of God "in Himself." But Rahner held that God does change "in another," the "other" being, in the Incarnation, the humanity of Christ, to which He, in the person of the Word, is hypostatically united, and Rahner insisted that this change cannot simply be reduced to a change "o/ the other." 34 We are here confronted with mystery, but appropriately the mystery is located in God. As Rahner writes:
In the finite alone as such there can be no absolute mysteries at all, because one can always conceive a finite intellect proportionate to any finite thing and able to fathom it. The mystery of the incarnation must lie in God himself: in the fact that he, though unchangeable "in himself," can become something "in another." We are grappling here also with the paradox of the created spirit, finite and at the same time in a sense infinite, finitum capax infiniti. Man and woman cannot actualize their orientation to God from the powers of their nature. For this they need God's grace, but when it is given them they do not become in themselves a mixture of divine being and human being, like oil and water. That would be a Calvinist understanding. They are human beings who have been divinized, and God's gifts to them, even the gift of Himself, have been humanized. When Hill writes of the lumen gloriae, "Once the infused light achieves its elevation, then the intelligence is already in proximate disposition to the terminative actuation by the divine 'forma intelligibilis.' So conceived this actuation is not so much one the intellect receives as one to which it is elevated," 37 he makes a total disjunction of reception and elevation. In this he is being consist- ent, but the fact of the matter must be that the elevation includes reception. Finally, it seems worth pointing out that Rahner's reflections on quasiformal causality, following St. Thomas, were sparked by a consideration of the beatific vision. Hill naturally follows this lead. Yet what Rahner was primarily interested in was the Incarnation and grace. From a methodological point of view it seems a pity that the hard labor of theology was expended on that one of the three instances of the selfcommunication of God which we know least about and for which much of the "knowledge" that we do have is highly speculative. Perhaps if the theorizing had begun with what the sources have to say about the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and only then were extended to the beatific vision, a surer path would have been trodden.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
I conclude with four points relating to our question, the first three being methodological and the fourth ecumenical.
Consistency in Terminology
As it is now not only possible but necessary to classify many theological statements as of either the "ascending" or the "descending" type, we must recognize that each of these methods has acquired its own appropriate terminology, self-contained and not interchangeable. This distinction should be respected at all times. Hence it is a methodological error to combine terms from both types in the one statement as though it were being made from a single perspective. For example, the word "incarnation" belongs to the descending type, while "anointing" belongs to the ascending type. Mühlen, therefore, should not have treated the anointing theme in the context of descending Christology. The insight enables us to see that what is called the Incarnation from one point of view may very well be the anointing with the Holy Spirit when seen from the other, though whether this is in fact the case has of course to be demonstrated. I stress, therefore, the need for a heightened sensitivity in this matter, with a resultant consistency and rigor in the use of terminology. A further example may be helpful. Right to the present day, exegetes and theologians commonly understand Jn 1:14 as teaching an incarnation in the metaphysical sense, i.e., the becoming-man of a pre-existent divine being who is divine in some ontological sense. I believe I have shown that this is not the case, and that such an interpretation is an example of the reading back of later development into the biblical text.
Theological Interpretation of Scripture
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In the evangelist's mind the "incarnation" is the same reality as the saving descent of the pre-existent Jesus, Son of Man, from heaven. But this does not mean that the text is worthless so far as the doctrine of the Incarnation is concerned. It means, rather, that the doctrine is found in Scripture in the seminal and anticipative form which we have been discussing. This text provided the biblical basis from which the doctrine of the metaphysical incarnation developed in the patristic era. It can be appealed to in this sense, but only this sense.
I conclude that theologians may, indeed must, give theological inter-pretations of Scripture but should not attribute them to the biblical writers themselves. Needless to say, they should inform themselves of what biblical scholarship has to say about the literal meaning of texts before they embark on their theological interpretation, for if a text is misconstrued at this level, the basis of correct interpretation is destroyed. There is then no guarantee that such interpretation will be correct.
Arguing from the Immanent to the Economic Trinity Here I am concerned with the legitimacy of arguing from the immanent to the economic Trinity. With Walter Kasper, I approve and have adopted Piet Schoonenberg's methodological principle, "Our whole thinking moves from reality towards God and can never move in the opposite direction
In no respect do we conclude from the Trinity to Christ and to the Spirit given to us, but always the other way round." 39 This being said, however, it is necessary to make a qualification. There are not just two, but three, ways of conceptualizing the Trinity. Two I have already mentioned, and the third, or rather the first, is the biblical. The biblical understanding of the Trinity is functional rather than ontological. The Father is the God of the Covenant; the Son is Jesus, whose divinity is conceived not in an ontological but in a functional way, the way of salvation history, which makes it a function or an attribute of his humanity; and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, the way in which God makes Christ present in power among his followers after his death.
Historically, reflection on this biblical understanding led to the formation of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity in the patristic age, which doctrine acquired precise formulation in the first two ecumenical councils. Reflection on this process reveals that it embodies the methodological principle enunciated above. But coming to the economic Trinity, we see that the process is now, and legitimately in this case, reversed. For the new information about the Trinity is fed back into the biblical understanding to produce the doctrine of the economic Trinity. It is the Christ of the economic Trinity who is the object of faith of Catholics (and Orthodox and many Anglicans and Protestants, indeed all nonfundamentalist Christians), and it is precisely this faith which inspires their spirituality. The faith of these Christians, then, is centered not on a Christ whose divinity is expressed simply in terms of the role which he played in salvation history, nor on the purely divine second person of the Trinity, but rather on this divine person become man in Jesus of Nazareth. The point is that when one has moved from the biblical to the immanent Trinity, one moves back from there, integrating the new knowledge with what was known before. This process of integra-tion is not a violation of Schoonenberg's principle (though in the light of our comments he is seen to have overstated it somewhat), for it does not claim to produce new knowledge at the level of the biblical Trinity. It is something that was not envisaged by Schoonenberg, though it is essential for faith, theology, and spirituality. I mention it here, especially in relation to the last point, because my own procedure of combining and integrating the bestowal model of the Trinity (which pertains to the immanent Trinity) with the relevant biblical data is thus relieved of a possible charge of faulty methodology.
The Bestowal Model and the Procession of the Spirit
My last point concerns the relevance of the bestowal model to the vexed question of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Kilmartin mentions the suggestion of I. H. Dalmais that the understanding of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son could be the key to the reconciliation of East and West on this issue. As has been said above, this understanding, though it originated in the West, is by no means foreign to the East, even though it is not the generally accepted view there. This is a subject which requires an extended treatment, but here I must be satisfied with making a few points in a summary way. But first it is necessary to explain something which is implicit in the model.
As the Father is prior to the Son in the sense that the Father begets the Son, the Holy Spirit must be in the first instance the love of the Father for the Son. And as the Son is homoousios (in the strict Athanasian sense) with the Father, the Son's return of love to the Father must be identical with the Father's love for Him, and so must also be the Holy Spirit. This provides the sense in which the Holy Spirit is said to be the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Here, then, we have three statements: the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father for the Son; the Holy Spirit is the answering love of the Son for the Father; and the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The explanation just given enables us to see that despite first appearances these three statements are compatible with each other. It also allows us to say that in the context of the divine love the first of them is the most basic, and the third is the most comprehensive, statement that can be made about the Holy Spirit.
The relevance of the model to the controversy can now be stated. As the mutual love of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit must be one, and must therefore proceed from a single principle, which is here indicated to be the Father and the Son (Western position). But as the love of the Father for the Son (most basic statement), the Holy Spirit must also be said to proceed from the Father alone (Eastern position). (One is here reminded of the teaching of Thomas Aquinas that the Holy Spirit
